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Studies into the Wealth of Nations have been the aim of economics since Adam 
Smith. However, the spectacular rise of some economies, beginning with 
industrializing England in the 18
th century, has been of particular interest. England’s 
rise has been as miraculous in the eyes of the observers as the rise of Germany and 
Japan from the ashes of World War II or the rise of South Korea from one of the 
poorest countries in the world to the league of OECD members in the second half of 
the twentieth century and later the rise of China. Nevertheless, to write about theories 
of “economic miracles” seems to be daring, since the architects of these “miracles”, 
like fervently Ludwig Erhard, flatly denied anything miraculous in the development of 
their respective economies. Modestly, they spoke of the natural result of liberalization 
or, in another case, “getting the basics right”. If this is the case, are there any ways to 
stellar economic performance to be emulated? Are there, more modestly, any 
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This paper discusses the thought on “economic miracles” regarding several 
prominent cases, namely Germany, Japan and larger East Asia. A number of macro-
economic, political, politico-economic and institutional factors have been pointed out 
as responsible for their miraculous development. While the development cannot be 
disconnected from its historical and institutional background, in particular institutional 
factors determining the economic order (Ordnungspolitik) can be identified as 
important for the “economic miracles”. In particular, the existence of an expectation-
equilibrium allowing for stable economic policies over time has been so far relatively 
underexposed. Without allowing for a naïve blueprint towards an economic miracle, 
lessons for development processes can be drawn. 
While the notion “economic miracle” denotes something spectacular, in fact it has 
been applied to quite a number of very diverse cases of economic development, 
diverse in time, extent, style, and geography. In fact, “miracles” seem to have 
happened fairly often, if the use of the term “economic miracle” is a reliable guide. 
Among others, the economic development of Europe, Asia, Korea, Japan, Germany, 
Taiwan, India, the Netherlands, Botswana, Estonia, Ireland, China, Argentine, Chile, 
Malaysia, Spain, Dubai, the United Kingdom and Vietnam has been described as 
miraculous at one point or another. Given the high priority of the underlying quest, 
namely that for rapid economic growth, the identification of so many miracles 
becomes more understandable. Studies into the Wealth of Nations have been the 
aim of economics since Adam Smith. However, the spectacular rise of some 
economies, beginning with industrializing England in the 18
th century, has been of 
particular interest. England’s rise has been as miraculous in the eyes of the 
observers as the rise of Germany and Japan of the ashes of World War II or the rise 
of South Korea from one of the poorest countries in the world to the league of OECD 
members in the second half of the twentieth century and later the rise of China. 
Miraculous in these cases were as well the new technologies, epitomized in the 
steam engine of the industrial revolution, the mechanization in the early and mid-20
th   3
century and the microchip in the late 20
th century, new forms of organization like the 
beginning industrial production in the 19
th century or the assembly-line of car 
production in the 20
th century, and the outcome, measured in terms of population 
dynamics and consumption per capita. 
To write about theories of “economic miracles” seems to be daring, since the 
architects of these “miracles”, like fervently Ludwig Erhard (“there are no miracles!”), 
flatly denied anything miraculous in the development of their respective economies. 
Modestly, they spoke of the natural result of liberalization or, in another case, “getting 
the basics right”. If this is the case, are there any ways to stellar economic 
performance to be emulated? Are there, more modestly, any lessons from the 
“economic miracles” of the past for the future development of other economies? This 
paper discusses the thought on “economic miracles” regarding several prominent 
cases, namely Germany, Japan and larger East Asia. A number of macro-economic, 
political, politico-economic and institutional factors have been pointed out as 
responsible for their miraculous development. The second part looks back into the 
case of Germany's economic miracle, the third section discusses Japan and the East 
Asian growth experience. Section 4 discusses commonalities and differences of the 
cases. While development cannot be disconnected from its historical and institutional 
background, in particular institutional factors determining the economic order 
(Ordnungspolitik) can be identified as important for the “economic miracles”. In 
particular, the existence of an expectation-equilibrium allowing for stable economic 
policies over time has been so far relatively underexposed. 
The conclusion (5.) discusses the applicability of the lessons of “miracle” countries for 
economic policy making purposes. Without allowing for a naïve blueprint towards an 
economic miracle, lessons for development processes can be drawn. 
 
 
2.   The German “economic miracle” revisited – multiple   causes,  but  no 
arbitrariness 
In the 19
th century, Germany had been a latecomer in industrialization, and this 
means also in growth performance. This changed around 1860, when Germany, like 
other European economies, achieved a strong push in growth rates which lasted until   4
the outbreak of World War I. Afterwards, the growth experience of European and 
North American countries began to differ strongly. 
All countries suffered from the war years and the aftermath of the war. But for some 
countries the decline in growth rates was less strong (notably, the USA and Canada), 
and for some countries the end of the 1920s despite the Great Depression brought a 
renewed strong growth performance, e.g. for Sweden. Germany, on the other hand, 
remained on a path of moderate growth in terms of the growth trend. After World War 
II, this changed quite spectacularly when the economic reforms of 1948 and 1949 
were implemented and Germany overtook most other European states in growth 
performance.
1 
The first phase of catch-up growth in the 19
th century was triggered by technological 
developments, economic liberalization and integration of the German economic area 
and related population dynamics. Since the end of the 19
th century, legal 
developments in Germany, in particular the decision by the German Imperial Court 
(Reichsgericht) of 1897 that cartels are legally binding, led to a centralization of 
economic power, in particular in key industries. The war economy of World War I and 
the subsequent phase of economic unrest in war-torn Germany reinforced cartels, 
like in the chemical industry (IG Farben) and the steel industry (Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke). At the same time, there was a secular trend to the centralization of 
political power. This began with the domination of Germany by the Prussian state 
after the realization of German unity in 1871, increased in the centralistic model of 
the first German republic, the Weimar Republic of 1919 to 1933 and peaked finally 
during the National Socialist phase during 1933 to 1945. This can be seen by 
comparing local autonomy and spending on different levels of government, both of 
which saw strong centralizing tendencies until the virtual abolishment of local 
autonomy by National Socialism. The totalitarian state after 1933 could not 
completely erase economic freedom, like its communist totalitarian counterpart in the 
Soviet Union did by nationalization, but was on the way to this goal and in the war 
economy after 1939 closely guided the industrial sector. A success of National 
Socialism probably would not have redressed, but rather reinforced nationalization 
tendencies. 
 
                                                 
1  For historical data see Maddison (1991), pp. 206-219, and the figure in Landes (1999),    
p. 247.   5
This is the backdrop for the rise of the Freiburg School of Economics as the 
intellectual forerunner and the introduction of the Social Market Economy in Germany 
as economic policy model by Ludwig Erhard as economic minister and Alfred Müller-
Armack as his state secretary.
2 Dubbed an „economic miracle“, Ludwig Erhard 
always stressed that the economic order implemented after 1948 was the reason for 
growth and that this was nothing miraculous. Erhard's reputation grew together with 
the German economy, a fact explaining his later election as the second German 
chancellor after Konrad Adenauer. Growth rates seem to have justified this decision, 
however, there have been forwarded competing explanations for the superior 
German growth performance of the time. 
 
•  The miracle as a reconstruction boom  
•  The miracle as return to pre-war growth path 
•  The miracle and the American influence 
•  The miracle and the role of personalities 
•  The miracle as currency-based mercantilism 
•  The miracle as a political ex-post rationalization 
 versus 
•  ordo-liberal explanations (institutions, their implementation, and the rise and 
decline of nations) 
Table 1: Competing explanations for Germany's Economic Miracle 
 
In the 1980s, economists and economic historians began to challenge the view that 
the German growth miracle was a consequence of economic policy decisions like the 
introduction of the new German Deutsche Mark. Rather, it was seen as the almost 
mechanical consequence of a reconstruction boom based on large-scale capital 
destruction in World War II (Reichel 2002). According to the neoclassical growth 
model of Solow long-run growth is determined by population dynamics and technical 
                                                 
2  For a history of the introduction of the Social Market Economy see Van Hook (2004), for 
its development and decline see Giersch at al. 1992.   6
progress. The destruction of the capital stock leads to a declining capital/ labour ratio, 
far below the long-run equilibrium. At the same time, productivity of capital is strongly 
increasing, Higher productivity growth rates means higher per-capital income growth 
rates, asymptotically approaching the long-run growth path.
3 
A related argument sees the German growth performance of the post-World War II 
phase as a return to a long-run, pre-war growth path. The full utilization of capacity, 
rapid capital formation, structural change enforced by destruction and the immigration 
of millions of refugees helped to fuel growth rates. Both arguments, the post-war 
reconstruction boom due to the renewal of the capital stock as well as the return to a 
long-run growth part, can explain partly the post-war growth, but according to 
regressions run by Reichel (2002) on medium-term growth rates there is a large, 
unexplained residuum so that the concludes, “that there certainly was strong 
reconstruction growth after the Second World War, but there is also strong evidence 
for an additional growth-promoting effect that perfectly coincides with the economic 
reforms undertaken by Erhard” (pp. 436-437). In particular, the reconstruction boom 
should also apply to East Germany, which it did not. Despite forced savings by the 
new communist regime growth rates always lagged clearly behind those of West 
Germany. 
Another argumentation line against the particular effects of the economic reforms of 
1948 to introduce the “Social Market Economy” is that American aid, American 
influence and the Marshall plan were strongly contributing to German growth. The 
political economy side of this argument is that currency reform and price liberalization 
were impossible without decree by the occupying forces and that the credit for reform 
accordingly should not go to Erhard and his economic policy. 
While formally right, it should be noted that sweeping price liberalization was not at all 
uncontested among occupying authorities and German politicians alike in the post-
war period and that the allied forces of the three Western zones tried to minimize 
central structures in Germany by founding not a German central bank, but rather a 
“Bank of States” (Bank deutscher Länder) in the spring of 1948.
4 This approach failed 
and finally the BdL became a fully-fledged central bank, the Bundesbank. But this 
episode shows that American support for German liberalization was not as 
                                                 
3  This theory is an important explanation for expectations of conditional convergence of 
developing countries. 
4
  See Horstmann (1985).   7
unequivocal as presumed by the supporters of the theory that American influence 
can explain German growth performance after 1948. Certainly, while initially after 
1945 the USA and in particular the United Kingdom with its new labour government 
favoured Social Democracy, later with the rise of cold war confrontation the interest in 
a clear market economic institutional system in Germany rose (Van Hook 2004, p. 5). 
However, price reforms after the currency reform of 1948 were initiated by Erhard 
without explicit agreement of the occupying authorities. 
As a macro-economic argument, the influence of the USA is seen in the Marshall 
plan aid (European Recovery Program) and, more general, the tendency for 
worldwide Keynesian demand policies after World War II. This again misses an 
important part of the explanation, since Marshall plan aid was rather symbolic for 
Germany (compared to much more substantial aid to the neighbouring states) and 
Keynesian demand policies did certainly contribute to stabilize demand after the war, 
but should have had no particular influence on Germany, which still had to wait some 
time before it was fully re-integrated in the world economy. 
Economic policy and economic history are not simply determined by mechanic 
historical „forces“, but also the result of personalities, creativity and alertness, or, as 
Ludwig von Mises put it, „homo agens“. 
Erhard's personality and personal experience as well as that of his contemporaries is 
also important to understand his later economic policy. Born as the son of a textile 
trader and himself learning textile trade before World War I, he was later, after war 
and studies of economics and business management a lobbyist for SME and 
consumer industries as well as macro-economic analyst in the “Institut für 
Wirtschaftsbeobachtung der Deutschen Fertigindustrie” in 1928. Already in the 3
rd 
Reich he spoke out against the primacy of heavy industry and later his strong 
emphasis on SME as the backbone of German industry was certainly influenced by 
this former occupation. Müller-Armack, his state secretary in the economic ministry, 
had a similar background in the SME-dominated textile sector, in the 
“Forschungsstelle für Allgemeine und Textile Marktwirtschaft” (Research institute for 
general and textile market economy). The personal background of the founders is 
certainly important to explain their later decisions, however it cannot really be seen 
as a substitute for the explanation of German growth performance after World War II   8
by ordo-liberalism and the Social Market Economy, but rather as a help to 
understand their development.
5 
Looking at West Germany's growth after 1948, the important and constant 
contribution of trade, unusual for such a large economy, led to the explanation of 
Germany's economic performance as the result of currency-based mercantilism. 
West Germany's “Deutsche Mark” entered the Bretton Woods system arguably 
undervalued (at 4.20 to the US-$ at September 18, 1948) and consequently faced a 
long phase of sustained competitiveness of its exporting industries. The Korean War 
crisis of 1950, when Ludwig Erhard decided despite strong pressure from opposition 
and trade unions against price controls, fostered the internal reputation of the 
Deutsche Mark as a stable currency. The London debt deal of 1953 and the 
settlement with Israel prevented another phase of currency instability like after World 
War I, when reparations and hyperinflation precluded sustained economic growth. 
While the German economy after 1948 was not miraculously liberalized in a big bang 
– for example, tariffs were still used as an instrument in crisis policy in the Korea 
crisis – external trade was a main factor to explain growth. However, this again (like 
the role of personalities) is not a competing explanation to that of the introduction of a 
new economic system as a basis for sustained growth, but rather an outcome of a 
policy favouring monetary stability – the primacy of monetary policy in the framework 
of Walter Eucken. 
Finally, there has been the argument that the “economic miracle” is nothing else but 
an ex-post rationalization of favourable economic circumstances. Ludwig Erhard 
himself saw nothing miraculous in the economic miracle of the Social Market 
Economy. However, in particular after the Korean crisis and in the wake of the 
general election of 1953 the efforts to “sell” the economic success of the Social 
Market Economy increased. An important role was played by a group of industrialists, 
where notably heavy industry and mining was absent, called “Die Waage”, which ran 
adds and cinema spots to convince people of the advantages of the Social Market 
Economy with the aid of modern marketing research and opinion polls. For the ruling 
Christian Democratic Union, to which chancellor Adenauer and economic minister 
Erhard belonged, as a modern, non-ideological party, the justification by economic 
                                                 
5  This development also includes the aforementioned background of centralization in 
economy and politics, as well as a certain initial sympathy for National Socialism by some 
later opponents to its economic policies like Müller-Armack.   9
success was important (Spicka 2007). The notion “Social Market Economy” itself was 
deliberately designed to distinguish it from the “laissez faire economy”, without clearly 
indicating how, which is the reason Hayek called it a “weasel word”. 
The above-mentioned theories deserve consideration and certainly they can explain 
partly German economic performance after 1948. However, they are either 
complementary – like explanations based on growth theory – or helpful in 
understanding economic policy making, but not contradicting the conclusion that 
Germany's economic policy decisions after 1948, based on ordo-liberal creed, played 
an important role in freeing the growth forces after the misallocation of resources 
through war and post-war administration. The ordo-liberal explanation in particular 
focuses on the role of stable money as a central and distinguishing feature of 
economic reform, the role of the liberalization of prices, and subsequently the role of 
competition policy, though here the link between the original blueprints of ordo-
liberalism and actual economic policy were weakest. Additionally, the economic 
miracle as the role of the destruction of distributive coalitions by the war, as 
envisaged by Mancur Olson (1982), is an important explanation fitting into the ordo-
liberal framework, though formulated in another context. All in all, the introduction of 
the Social Market Economy in Germany can be seen as a rare example of “theory-in-
action”, a close relation of economic theory and policy making. 
First of all, the primacy of monetary policy was based on the experience of 
hyperinflation in 1923 and the period of high inflation after 1945. Stability of money 
was a social and political issue – the rise of National Socialism in the 1920s had 
much to do with the loss or threat to income of the petty bourgeois – but also as a 
precondition for implementing the basic principle of a market economy, namely a 
functioning price system. It is no wonder that West Germany after 1949, though 
generally wary of nationalism after the war, experienced a particular form of it, 
namely “Deutsche Mark”-nationalism, a certain form of pride in the currency as well 
as an anxiety that currency stability might get lost. The comprehensive freeing of 
prices in 1948, after the currency reform, was the other pillar of the implementation of 
the basic principle of the market economy. 
The influence of cartels, which allowed for freer domestic markets, was reduced 
considerably by the divestiture of leading cartels like IG Farben after World War II by 
the allied occupation forces. Later, Erhard fought long for a competition law, which   10
finally in 1957 was concluded. Though an independent cartel office should guarantee 
the strong position of competition, it never became quite as successful as the 
monetary authority, the Bundesbank. Erhard fought against exceptions from 
competition law nationally and in the new European Economic Community, but often 
in vain. 
The destruction of distributive coalitions as described by Mancur Olson refers to the 
forcible end of asymmetric regulations in favour of certain business groups due to the 
war in Germany as well as in Japan, and, though to a more or lesser extent, in the 
other countries ravaged by the war. In peaceful time, asymmetric rent-seeking by 
interest groups leads to a sclerotization of economies due to decreased freedom and 
increased burdens by regulations and taxes in favour of certain special interests, 
namely those which are relatively more homogeneous and where the free-rider-
problem can more easily be overcome.
6 The United Kingdom, where the war did not 
lead to a disruption of society and economic structures, suffered subsequently from 
the “English disease” in the 1970s, but also Germany and Japan, initially after World 
War II rapidly growing, saw declining growth rates and sclerosis. Though this theory 
has never been intended to describe a mechanical rise and decline of growth rates, it 
can explain the relative success of the Social Market Economy in its implementation 
phase, when adverse pressure groups were less well-organized and a window of 
opportunity for reform existed. 
The introduction of the Social Market Economy is a rare case of “theory-in-action”. 
The long-lasting economic policy discourse, since the early 1930s in Freiburg in the 
ordo-liberal school, later in the war years in various circles of economists and 
oppositional foreseeing the end of National Socialism, gave the Social Market 
Economy a strong theoretical foundation. The collaboration of two extraordinary 
economists with practical experience and of widely respected advisors was 
instrumental in implementing the concept against many odds – it is important, not to 
forget, that the Erhard reforms were indeed not very popular in the beginning. It also 
has to be mentioned that blueprint, as developed by the Freiburg school and related 
economists, and actual economic system, from the beginning were not identical, 
though over time differences dramatically increased. The window of opportunity to 
start again and differently after the war, the “Stunde Null” as tabula rasa was the 
                                                 
6  See Olson's Logic of Collective Action (Olson 1965).   11
suitable time for a fundamental economic policy shift not possible under the pressure 
of interest groups in established economies. 
The German Social Market Economy as an economic system derived from the ideas 
of ordo-liberalism proved to be remarkably robust; the alterations made in the 
German political process in the last six decades might have led to sclerotization in 
the Olsonian sense, but still the basic elements of the German economic system can 
withstand scrutiny. Indeed, after 1989 there was a renaissance of market economic 
thought throughout the world, and the German Social Market Economy became a 
model character again in many Central and Eastern European states. Ordo-
liberalism, with its stress on the interdependence of order, proved to be a more 
comprehensive answer to the challenge of transformation than the neo-classical, 
more mechanical so-called “Washington Consensus” of policy reform, with the 
disregard for institutional change and its features. 
The German economic growth performance after 1948 had many “fathers”, not only 
Erhard, the “father of the economic miracle”, like every successful model. But, while 
macroeconomic explanations are important to understand the growth dynamics after 
the war, they cannot explain the superior performance as well compared to European 
neighbouring market economies or to centrally-planned economies with a similar war 
experience. This is particularly true for the first ten years of the Social Market 
Economy, when the economic dynamic was markedly different. However, if Germany 
indeed had a superior performance, does that mean that growth is dependent on an 
ordo-liberal model? The next section shows that this is not necessarily the case. 
 
3.   The Japanese and East Asian Growth Experience - tigers, little tigers and 
paper tigers 
East Asia's growth model has often been described as a distinctly non-market model 
of rapid growth and catching-up. This is as well true for Japan, the first nation 
experiencing high growth rates, as for the waves of “tiger economies”, “small tigers” 
and the second wave of former communist economies transforming, like Vietnam and 
especially China. However, it should be noted that not all economies grouped in this 
category had the same impressive growth performance. While Korea realized the 
worldwide highest growth rates from the 1960s through 1980s, the Philippines, once 
the second-richest economy in East Asia behind Japan, registered much less   12
impressive growth rates. Differences are especially marked for per-capita-GDP, since 
some countries like Japan and Korea underwent the same dramatic demographic 
transition than Western countries, with much high life expectancy and much lower 
birth rates changing the population pyramid, while in other countries per-capita-
growth was “eaten up” by relatively higher birth rates.  
The Japanese Economic Miracle denotes the rise of Japan from the ashes of World 
War II to become one of the most modern economies worldwide in the span of four 
decades. The “East  Asian miracle”, popularized by a World Bank report accordingly 
named (World Bank 1993), is the subsequent rapid economic growth of “tiger states” 
(South Korea, Taiwan Hong Kong, Singapore) and “small tigers” (Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand). Though here an extensive discussion of their 
growth performance is not possible, it is important to see that the discussion about 
their growth performance has similar traits like that of the German Social Market 
Economy.
7 
                                                 












Table 2: Competing explanations for East Asia's Economic Miracle 
 
Japan was the first outlier in East Asian economic growth. Already in the 19
th century 
Japan was most successful among Asian countries in adapting modern Western 
technology and administration during the Meiji Restauration. The rise of Japan to 
become the dominating power in East Asia was abruptly stopped with its defeat in 
World War II. Industry and basic infrastructure was widely destroyed, the territorial 
acquisitions after 1894 were separated from Japan and the United States governed 
the country through the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP). Millions of 
ethnic Japanese settling formerly in the colonies had to be reintegrated. The powerful 
prewar industry conglomerates, the zaibatsu, were dissolved as part of the Japanese 
war machine. Inflation, unemployment and shortages threatened the stability of 
Japan. However, after SCAP backed the recovery of the economy and in particular 
with the onset of the Korean War Japan's economy began to grow at a rapid pace. 
Industrial production increased by 36,8 percent in 1951 alone. Overall, in the period 
of 1950 to 1973, the Japanese economy expanded by almost 10 percent a year. In 
the 1970s, it still grew by an average 5 percent a year and in the 1980s by 4 percent 
a year. Among the characteristics of the Japanese postwar economy were the strong 
influence of industrial planning by the state, in particular by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), the re-emergence of dominant business 
•  The miracle as an accumulation boom  
•  The miracle as a result of superior bureaucratic planning 
•  The miracle and the American influence 
•  The miracle and the role of personalities 
•  The miracle as currency-based mercantilism 
•  The miracle as a political ex-post rationalization 
versus 
•  ordo-liberal explanations (institutions, their implementation, and the 
rise and decline of nations)   14
groups,  keiretsu, with strong horizontal and vertical integration and house banks 
catering for the needs of industry, a labor market with enterprise unions closely 
interested in the fate of their companies, lifetime employment, and the rapid 
adaptation of technology. In the period from 1950 to 1973 the strong contribution of 
factor productivity to growth was particularly remarkable (Valdés 2003, p. 69, table 1). 
Explanations for the Japanese economic miracle have always been competing: In the 
1950s and 1960s Japan was seen as a successful model of modernization due to 
US-led economic and political reform, massive inflow of American aid and low 
defense spending due to the alliance with the US (Allen 1958, Forsberg 2000). 
Japanese economists challenged this view and referred to the modernization 
success in the 19
th century and hence, the cultural roots of Japan's economic miracle 
(Hein 1996,). A key factor of growth was the export orientation of Japan's industry, 
which at the same time was protected by selective liberalization, allowing the free 
importation of inputs and intermediate goods, but closing the market for consumer 
goods of foreign countries. The low entry rate of the yen into the international 
monetary system, which until 1973 was a system of fixed exchange rates (Bretton 
woods) helped Japan to accumulate large trade surpluses. International economic 
integration into the GATT (1963), IMF and OECD (1964), where Japan soon became 
a major player, aided the internationalization of Japan's economy. In particular 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) stressed the role of the MITI and sparked a debate about 
Japan's success as a developmental state. Others were skeptical on the almost 
mythical power of foresight attributed to industrial policy of the MITI (Okimoto 1989). 
Mancur Olson (1982) saw the destruction of powerful distributional coalitions at the 
heart of the growth success of Japan in the post-war period, a record, which is 
consistent with the later decline of growth rates. 
While the Japanese economic miracle had enormous impact on its East and 
Southeast Asian neighbors, as well through direct investment (the so-called flying 
geese model, Ozawa 2005) and as a model of development, in the 1980s the initial 
virtuous circle of accumulation, in which cheap credit by banks played an important 
role, became a vicious circle of debts for companies too big to fail and the prolonged 
existence of these so-called zombie companies, leading to two lost decades for 
Japanese growth in the 1990s and 2000s and greatly diminishing the appeal of the 
Japanese economic model.   15
The discussion of East Asia's miracle began in earnest, when the aforementioned 
World Bank report of 1993 was published. It tried to summarize as successful 
features of East Asia's different national economic policies the fact that most 
countries “got the basics right”, i.e. created an environment where the growth of 
private investment and investment in human capital succeeded. This included a 
relatively low degree of inequality, high productivity growth in agriculture, relatively 
efficient (corruption-free) public administrations and market-enhancing instead of 
market-distorting interventions (like export goals plus a certain measure of 
protectionism for home markets instead of simply import substitution). It also included 
crucially macroeconomic stability, investment in human capital, in particular primary 
and secondary education, a functioning price system, a stable, though not 
necessarily market-oriented financial sector and selective instead of massive 
interventions, like selective credit allocation or export promotion. Market failure 
through asymmetric information in the financial sector and underdevelopment of the 
banking sector was, according to the report, overcome by special measures like long-
term financial allocation by the state and the foundation of specialized public 
industrial banks (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia). Overall, states were open for 
foreign technology, though FDI policy was not uniform. 
This view was challenged by Krugman with this 1994 article “The Myth of Asia's 
Miracle”, in which he put quantitative growth into the foreground and compared East 
Asia's growth performance to the rapid growth of the Soviet Union and its satellites 
since the 1950s through forced savings and expanded use of capital and, in 
particular, labour. This growth, Krugman predicted, would end. Though, certainly, 
expansion of inputs did play a role in East Asia's growth, it took a very different form 
than that of the socialist states, a factor not duly stressed by Krugman.
8 The idea of a 
miracle based on “perspiration instead of inspiration” was certainly catchy, however, 
critics asserted that it did not see the rapid assimilation of technologies, also those 
incorporated in the increased use of capital, for example in new machines, as for 
example Nelson and Pack (1999) argued. 
In particular in the case of Korea and Taiwan, American influence and American aid 
have been stressed as factors explaining rapid catching-up. However, this is 
                                                 
8
  For example, the Soviet Union tried to expand labour input by harvest campaigns for high 
school and university students. East Asian countries, on the other hand, reduced the use 
of young labour by increasing enrollment in schools.   16
misleading on various accounts. Though US aid was important for Korea in the 
1950s, its growth “miracle” began when aid was less important, in the 1960s, and aid 
declined subsequently in importance, while growth rates climbed. Also in terms of the 
economic system, American influence played certainly a role after World War II, it 
was quite limited by domestic political factors. 
Personalities played an important role in various countries, like the legendary Lee 
Kuan Yew (prime minister from 1959 to 1990) in Singapore or Park Chung-Hee 
(president from 1962 to 1979) in Korea. Often ruling authoritarian regimes and 
disregarding human rights, they are remembered mostly for their dedication to growth 
and development. The idea of the “developmental dictatorship” originates in such 
personalities. However, first of all not all successful East Asian countries did have 
charismatic leaders, for example Japan, and second these persons might have been 
instrumental in implementing a certain economic order, but their activities are not to 
be judged independently from that order. Related to the role of personalities is the 
ex-post rationalization of miracles. This is certainly true to some extent in the 
memoirs of Lee (1999) in a time when the East Asian crisis of 1997 and 1998 
required a reassertion. But it does not at all explain the indeed stellar growth 
performance of several East Asian countries. The idea of “tigers and small tigers” (or, 
in East Asia itself, dragons and small dragons) is another form of ex-post 
rationalization, though in particular some small tigers were rather paper tigers. 
Like in the case of Germany's economic miracle, East Asia's miracle has been 
explained as currency-based as well as trade-based mercantilism. While this is 
mechanically true – growth in East Asian countries for a long time was more 
dependent on the external contribution of high trade surpluses than of domestic 
demand, compared for example with the United States, it does not explain why these 
states were so successful in developing a functioning export sector, while many other 
states failed to do so. Currency undervaluation, often cited for China, was not a 
problem in most other East Asian countries, where pegged exchange rates plus more 
or less high inflation differentials to the US-dollar meant a tendency for over-
valuation, which only in the East Asian crisis was erased. 
Certainly, it is much more difficult to put a number of very different country cases 
together as in this section compared to the section above. In some countries, growth 
was visibly hampered by authoritarian (non-development) states, like in Indonesia or   17
Burma, in other states growth declined with political unrest, like in Thailand and the 
Philippines. Economic policy differences were large: for example, Singapore and 
Hong Kong based their growth on the inflow of foreign investment, while Japan and 
Korea were long-time closed. Can their be a common denominator for the East Asian 
growth experience, and can that even be a shared denominator with the case of 
Germany? This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.  Commonalities and differences in economic miracles institutions, 
institutional competition and culture 
On the surface, Germany and East Asia are totally opposed cases. It is true that 
Germany in the 1950s was much less open in some respects, e.g. in trade policy or 
the financial sector, than today taken for granted, and that in East Asia economic 
freedom was much larger than sometimes assumed by proponents of the explanation 
of growth as the result of powerful bureaucratic planning – even authoritarian states 
were much less controllable than centrally-planned economies. Moreover, they are 
cases represent cases of Olsonian destruction of distributive coalitions, in Germany, 
Japan and Korea through the war and post-war period, in other states through the 
rise of authoritarian governments. But this covers only one aspect of their growth 
experience. Economic policies with regards to a number of fields were quite distinct: 
some countries based their growth on a thriving SME sector, like Germany and 
Taiwan, some on large conglomerates like the Japanese keiretsu and the Korean 
chaebol. Competition policy played a much more important role in Germany than in 
most East Asian states. Trade policies were very different, with Germany integrated 
in a common market in Europe and Asian countries wary of trade integration until the 
last two decades. 
Despite these differences, there is a commonality, not in the form of economic 
institutions, but in the fact that economic institutions seem to have allowed the long-
term accumulation of private investment and human capital. Dubbed “constancy of 
economic policy” in Walter Eucken's seminal work on economic policy, one can also 
describe this as an accepted growth model based on a stable institutional 
(expectations)- equilibrium,  leading to an overall fulfillment of  expectations and 
allowing for long-term orientation of policies and private plans.   18
Among the most important elements of an economic system necessary to be 
analyzed are the formal and informal institutions.9 Formal institutions are determined 
on the “market of institutions” of a country, which is a metaphor for the interaction of 
the market for politics with the markets for goods and services as well as factor 
markets. The market for politics includes on the supply side political entrepreneurs 
and the bureaucracy, supplying certain policies. The demand side includes (as 
sometimes overlapping groups) consumers, tax payers, workers and investors, which 
choose by voice in democracies (elections and demonstrations, political debate), as 
well as by exit options (like migration and capital flight). The exit option relates the 
market for politics with the markets for goods and services. Interest groups take a 
mediating position between supply and demand side, being characterized by 
asymmetrical information vis-à-vis both groups. Institutional alternatives become 
clear through exit and voice, i.e. institutional competition. The intensity of institutional 
competition is depending on international as well as national regimes, for example of 
trade. Globalization increased the intensity of institutional competition dramatically. 
Informal institutions together with the formal institutions determine the economic 
system. They are central to understand the performance of formal institutions. They 
are not static, but their change is piecemeal and slow. This is an important reason for 
the different results of the same formal institutions in different regions. The 
effectiveness of informal institutions, which are not enforced by the state monopoly 
for power, is depending on the perception of market actors about their legitimacy. 
Therefore, another factor for economic change and stability of an economic system 
becomes important, namely the perceptions, the actors have about its functioning. 
Since market actors (as well as external observers) have no complete information, 
they formulate hypotheses about the functioning of the economic system, which 
determine their choice of goals and instruments. These hypotheses are again 
depending on cognitive schemata, which help the actors to reduce uncertainty in the 
face of incomplete information. When hypotheses are permanently frustrated, new 
hypotheses will be build. However, this does not automatically lead to a different 
acting: As long as the enforcement mechanism for informal institutions works, 
opportunistic behaviour can prevail. 
                                                 
9  While the definition of both is not universal, mostly they are distinguished by their 
enforcement mechanism (state monopoly in the case of formal, private, decentralized 
enforcement by social norms, customs or other arrangements in the case of informal 
institutions).   19
However, this also means that relatively small changes in the perception of 
institutions can have large effects, if a critical mass for institutional change is 
reached, like in the transformation processes in formerly socialist states. 
To understand the change of economic systems, first the relevant market for formal 
institutions has to be analyzed. This market is on the one side embedded into the 
context of international institutional competition, on the other side related to informal 
institutions in a functional relation. An equilibrium of expectations in an economy can 
be defined as the state, when grosso modo the expectations of actors about the 
functioning of institutions are not frustrated. These expectations again are depending 
on cognitive schemata of actors about these institutions. 
These schemata, which are dependent on self-perception and the perception of 
others, are until now barely analyzed. 
The equilibrium of expectations should not be confounded with a normatively optimal 
state of the economy. Stable expectations also can exist in face of dictatorship and 
economic decline, but permanent macroeconomic imbalances or crises will one day 
also lead to a crisis of the economic model.
10  The crisis of the model leads to 
transformation, which has again two aspects, namely the intended consequences 
initiated for example by the state to transform the economic system and the often 
more important unintended consequences
11. The unintended consequences are for 
example depending on the relation of formal and informal institutions or on the 
perception of human actors of the changed institutions. Looking at the change of 
economic systems from such a point of view also allows to draw normative 
conclusions concerning the adaptive efficiency of an economic system. 
Figure 1 includes the different aspects discussed above in a framework for the 
analysis of institutional analysis for the case of post-war West Germany.
12 For the 
international context, in particular the original limited sovereignty after World War II, 
later the increasing importance of European integration, for example in shaping 
competition policy, are important. 
                                                 
10  Economic model not understood in the sense of a Weberian ideal type, but as the model, 
the actors have of an economy. 
11 Cf. Hayek (1969). The analysis of unintended consequences of human action is for Hayek 
the foremost aim of social science, cf. Hayek (1979), p. 41. 
12  The model framework has first been introduced in Seliger (2004).   20
The market for politics is characterized, among others, by a large and successful 
modern conservative party, CDU/ CSU, as the main carrier of economic reform. 
Interest groups, though always existing, exerted limited influence in the immediate 
post-war situation and only slowly regained power to add asymmetric regulatory 
burdens to the economy. Among the informal institutions, a certain post-war 
concentration on economic success as a compensation for lost political aspirations 
after the war might be as important as the existing working ethics. Perceptions of 
Germany's economy then include the widely shared – domestic and abroad – idea of 
a “miracle” and a personalization in the “father of the economic miracle”, Ludwig 
Erhard. The cultural context includes the traumatic war experience, leading to 
consumerism and wariness of political exposure of Germany after the lost war, the 
traumatic inflation experience of 1923 and 1945-1947, leading to a strong preference 
for stability, monetary and otherwise, and standard of justice and fairness, leading to 
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International context: Institutional competition and  
 institutional constraints 
here: role of occupying forces, competition of economic models and competition for 
investment; European integration as a an increasingly important paradigm of foreign 
economic policy 
__________________________________________________________ 









Perception of institutions (self perception; perception of others); 
“the economic miracle“; “the father of the economic miracle, Ludwig Erhard” 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Cultural context; cognitive models 
Here especially: models of economic policy and the economy, standards of justice 
and fairness, traumatic war and inflation experience, “wir sind wieder wer” (we did it 
again) feeling in the 1950s 
Figure 1: The institutional system of post-war Germany – a stylization 
 
Also, for the case of East Asian catching-up, some commonalities can be included in 
a similar institutional model like in Figure 2. In the international context, peer pressure 
in East Asia has been an important factor for some states, in particular latecomers 
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like the “small tigers”. The role of American advisors was important in post-war 
Japan, in Taiwan and Korea. Competition of systems with communist neighbours 
was particularly strong again in Korea and Taiwan, but also played an important role 
in economic modernization in Southeast Asia. The formal institutions were often 
determined by authoritarian political systems, often with leaders of leading families, 
but with marked exceptions like Japan (formal democracy with a strong government 
party) or Hong Kong (colony with considerable internal autonomy). Voters were not 
really determining most of the East Asian political models, though they did play a 
role, as did labour unions in some countries. As for the informal institutions, those 
related to the dominant societal model, in many states a form of latter-days 
Confucianism, played an important role, with features like the seniority principle and a 
strong desire for formal education. The perception of “tiger states” had been 
accepted not only abroad, but also in the countries and thereby shaped behaviour, 
e.g. voting preferences or working ethics.   23
International context: Institutional competition and institutional constraints 
here: peer pressure and American advisors; competition of economic systems with 
communist neighbours 
__________________________________________________________ 
Formal institutions: “market for institutions“ 







Perception of institutions (self perception; perception of others) 
“tiger states” (or dragons), „KORANDO“ (Koreans can do)
13 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Cultural context; cognitive models 
Here especially: models of economic policy and the economy (developmental state), 
standards of justice and fairness, “Confucian” working and education ethics 







                                                 
13  Korando is the name of one of the first Korean SUV. It is reportedly a contraction of 
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5.  Conclusion – towards a theory of economic miracles? 
 
The discussion of economic miracles above shows that the economic institutions 
leading to miraculous results were quite different. Kairos, the window of opportunity, 
played an important role, as did long-run informal institutions embedded in certain 
cultural and institutional backgrounds. At the same time, there seem to be factors 
precluding miracles, including macroeconomic instability caused by economic policy 
decisions as microeconomic factors like failed planning approaches. If this 
institutional model can help to identify features of successful economic systems 
leading to high growth rates, it begs the question, if a premeditated adaption of 
institutional systems is possible. The relevancy of this question is clear, but the 
answer is far from obvious. While indeed there have been cases of successful 
institutional imitation, they are often limited to similar circumstances in terms of 
cultural embeddedness, international context and pre-existing institutional system.
14 
The above-sketched institutional model of an expectations-equilibrium as the 
outcome of the interaction of the formal institutions, determined through the 
interaction of the market for politics with economic decisions, and informal 
institutions, and shaped by the international context as well as the cultural context, 
does not claim to be comprehensive to understand institutional systems, and even 
less, growth performance. 
But it can show the importance of certain institutional factors for growth performance, 
which have to be included into the analysis of the relative success of economic 
systems. By that, it can add to the discussion of economic performance as the result 






                                                 
14  For example, it has been noted that the Baltic states with a certain experience of market 
economies and democracies had a head start in transformation compared to other former 
Soviet states.    25
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